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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1587 
___________ 
 
MELQUI RAMON DELEON MENDEZ, 
                                                                Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                        Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-087-858) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy Harbeck 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2013 
Before:  SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR. and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 28, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Melqui De Leon Mendez (―De Leon‖), a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered 
the United States without inspection in May 2000 and was placed in removal proceedings 
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in April 2009.  He was charged with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 
as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.  De Leon 
conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (―CAT‖).  An immigration judge found that De Leon’s 
testimony was inconsistent with the record and that he was not credible, denied his 
requests for relief, and ordered his removal.  De Leon’s appeal to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖) was dismissed, and he now petitions this Court for 
review.
1
 
 The crux of De Leon’s claims for relief was that he feared returning to Guatemala 
because members of the MS-13 gang attempted to recruit him during his adolescence and 
threatened and beat him when he declined to join.  However, De Leon’s accounts of the 
number of times he was threatened and the severity of physical assaults he suffered 
varied dramatically between his testimony and the record.  First, he indicated in his 
application for asylum that he was threatened fifteen times and was kicked so severely on 
one occasion that he was bedridden for a week. A.R. 276.  Next, he provided a 
supplemental statement which described only three incidents in which he was personally 
threatened to join the gang and two assaults in which he was punched.  A.R. 183-90.  
Finally, he testified that he was threatened twice, and he did not indicate that he was 
kicked or bedridden until confronted with his asylum application on cross-examination.  
                                              
1
  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review final orders of removal.   
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A.R. 146-47, 159-60.   De Leon argues that the BIA should have excused these 
inconsistencies because the mistreatment he described occurred nearly ten years prior to 
his immigration proceedings when he was only 14 or 15 years old.  This argument is 
unpersuasive, however; De Leon’s application, supplemental statement, and testimony 
were each proffered within a period of less than four months and he offers no indication 
why his account varied so dramatically over such a short period.   
 In light of the inconsistencies identified by the BIA, we are not compelled to 
disagree with the adverse credibility determination.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 
477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  Because De Leon failed to provide credible testimony in 
support of his application for withholding of removal, we discern no error in the BIA’s 
determination that he was not entitled to relief.  See Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 
180, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2003).  De Leon’s present assertion that ―specific intent to torture is 
not required‖ to demonstrate eligibility for CAT relief, ―but rather that simply showing 
that the government was willing to turn a blind eye in acquiescing to torture was enough‖ 
is simply incorrect.  Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(―[T]he CAT requires a showing of specific intent,‖ and ―[w]illful blindness can be used 
to establish knowledge but it does not satisfy the specific intent requirement.‖).  Thus, to 
the extent the BIA may have erred by failing to address his claim that the immigration 
judge incorrectly required a showing of specific intent to torture, any error was harmless  
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because the claim is meritless.
 2
  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 
2011) (―[W]e will view an error as harmless and not necessitating a remand to the BIA 
when it is highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of the case.‖).   We 
will therefore deny the petition for review. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
2
  De Leon’s application for asylum was filed in August 2009—over nine years after he 
entered the United States—and the immigration judge therefore found that it was 
untimely.  De Leon did not challenge the timeliness determination on appeal to the BIA, 
and his failure to exhaust the issue deprives this Court of jurisdiction over any related 
arguments in his petition for review.  See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  The government argues that De Leon likewise failed to exhaust his claim 
regarding the denial of CAT relief because the issue was not raised in his brief before the 
BIA, however the issue was raised—albeit briefly—in his notice of appeal.  A.R. 53.  We 
therefore disagree.  Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Lin v. 
Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2008) (―[S]o long as an immigration petitioner 
makes some effort, however insufficient, to place the [BIA] on notice of a 
straightforward issue being raised on appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have exhausted 
her administrative remedies.‖). 
 
